Two companion bills that would slash credit-card interest rates by more than half have gone nowhere in Congress, even as the average rate charged by commercial banks sits above 21%. Senate Bill 381 and House Resolution 1944, each titled the 10 Percent Credit Card Interest Rate Cap Act, were referred to their respective committees and have not advanced since. The gap between the proposed ceiling and the rate cardholders actually pay now exceeds 11 percentage points, leaving tens of millions of revolving balances exposed to costs the sponsors call “exorbitant.”
Why the 10% cap bills have stalled past committee referral
Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, a Democrat from New York, and Rep. Anna Paulina Luna, a Republican from Florida, introduced the House version of the bill, which was referred to House Financial Services on March 6, 2025. No hearing date, markup, or floor vote has appeared on the official legislative tracker since that referral. The Senate companion, S.381, sits in the Senate Banking Committee under identical conditions, with no recorded action beyond introduction.
The bipartisan pairing of Ocasio-Cortez and Luna was designed to signal cross-aisle appeal. Yet the absence of any committee scheduling suggests the proposal lacks the support needed to move through the panels that oversee banking regulation. Card-issuing banks generate a large share of their consumer-lending revenue from interest rates well above 15%, and a hard cap at 10% would compress those margins sharply. That structural dependence on high rates helps explain why neither chamber’s leadership has pushed the measure forward.
Federal Reserve data tracked in the commercial-bank credit-card rate series shows the average interest rate exceeding 21% across recent observations. In the broader consumer credit statistics, revolving balances remain elevated, which magnifies the dollar impact of even small changes in APR. Each month the bills sit idle, cardholders carrying revolving balances absorb the full distance between that rate and the 10% cap the legislation envisions.
What the bill text actually requires of lenders
The legislative language in the Senate proposal establishes a 10% all-in APR cap on credit-card extensions of credit. “All-in” is the operative phrase: the bill includes anti-evasion provisions targeting fees that fall outside the traditional definition of a finance charge. If a card issuer restructured costs as service fees or processing charges to skirt the cap, those fees would still count toward the 10% limit.
Violations would be treated as breaches of the Truth in Lending Act. That classification matters because TILA carries its own civil-liability framework, giving affected cardholders a path to recover excess interest and fees. The House companion, described in the corresponding House text, mirrors this structure. By tying enforcement to an existing federal statute rather than creating a new regulatory body, the sponsors chose a mechanism that could, in theory, be enforced through current Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Federal Reserve channels.
The bills do not mandate specific underwriting standards or dictate which consumers must be approved for credit. Instead, they focus on the price of that credit once extended. Issuers could still deny applications or reduce credit limits in response to the cap. That design choice reflects a trade-off: the sponsors prioritize lower maximum rates for those who keep their cards over guaranteed access for higher-risk applicants.
Unresolved questions for cardholders watching the legislation
Several gaps limit any confident prediction about the bills’ future. Neither the Congressional Budget Office nor the Joint Committee on Taxation has published a cost or revenue-impact score for either measure, depriving lawmakers of official estimates on how the cap might affect federal revenues, consumer spending, or bank profitability. Without that scoring, committee leaders have less incentive to schedule hearings that would force a public debate over the trade-offs.
Another open question is how issuers would respond operationally if a cap ever became law. Banks could cut back on rewards programs, annual-fee waivers, or sign-up bonuses that are currently funded in part by high revolving-interest income. They might also tighten approval criteria, steering more marginal borrowers toward secured cards or other products not covered by the cap. None of those outcomes is addressed directly in the statutory text, leaving implementation details to regulators and market forces.
For consumers, the practical impact hinges on two uncertainties: whether the bills will move at all, and whether any eventual compromise would keep the 10% figure intact. A higher ceiling, phased-in timetable, or exemptions for smaller issuers are all possibilities that could emerge if the proposals ever reach the amendment stage. Until then, the bills function more as a political marker of frustration with current rates than as an imminent change to cardholder statements.
In the meantime, the combination of elevated APRs and persistent revolving balances ensures that interest charges remain a significant drag on household finances. The 10 Percent Credit Card Interest Rate Cap Act would sharply narrow that gap, but its stalled status underscores how difficult it is to legislate lower borrowing costs in a system built around risk-based pricing and fee-driven revenue. Unless committee leaders decide to test that model, the 10% cap will stay on paper while cardholders continue paying more than double that rate in practice.
