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The Money Overview

When your hospital drops your Medicare Advantage plan, you pay out-of-network rates or must switch coverage for the next year

Medicare Advantage enrollees who lose access to their hospital mid-year face a hard choice: absorb higher out-of-network costs immediately or wait to switch plans during a narrow window that requires federal approval. On January 9, 2025, the federal government determined that a Cigna Medicare Advantage network change in Delaware was significant enough to trigger a Special Election Period, offering affected beneficiaries roughly two months to find new coverage. That case exposed how relief depends on individual CMS decisions rather than automatic safeguards, leaving patients in limbo when hospitals and insurers part ways.

How a Cigna network exit forced a federal response in Delaware

When a hospital drops out of a Medicare Advantage plan’s network, enrollees do not automatically get the right to switch coverage outside the annual open enrollment window. Federal rules allow a Special Enrollment Period only under limited exceptions, including a significant change in a plan’s provider network. But the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) must first review the situation and determine that the disruption qualifies. Until that determination arrives, enrollees are stuck.

The Delaware case illustrates how this plays out in practice. The state announced that CMS concluded Cigna’s changes to its Medicare Advantage provider network were substantial enough to meet the threshold for a Special Election Period. According to the Delaware notice, affected enrollees received a roughly two‑month window to move to a different Medicare Advantage plan or to Original Medicare. Without that decision, those patients would have remained locked into a plan where their hospital was no longer in-network, paying higher cost-sharing for the rest of the plan year or delaying care entirely.

The gap between a network exit and a CMS determination creates real financial exposure. During that period, patients who visit a now out-of-network hospital face cost-sharing rates that can be substantially higher than in-network amounts. CMS rules do require Medicare Advantage plans to pay non‑contracted providers for covered Part A and Part B services at no less than Original Medicare rates. That floor protects hospitals and clinicians from being paid nothing, but it does not cap what the patient owes above Original Medicare levels under the plan’s out-of-network terms. As a result, beneficiaries can encounter surprise bills even though the underlying services remain covered by Medicare.

For many enrollees, especially those with chronic conditions who rely on a specific hospital or physician group, the disruption is more than a matter of dollars. Losing an in‑network hospital mid‑year can interrupt treatment plans, complicate access to specialists, and force patients to choose between continuity of care and financial protection. The Delaware decision shows that CMS can intervene, but it also underscores that relief is not guaranteed unless the agency formally declares the network change “significant” enough.

CMS rule changes and the limits of new protections

CMS has taken steps to address some of the cost-sharing risks tied to out-of-network care. The Contract Year 2025 Medicare Advantage and Part D Final Rule, identified as CMS‑4205‑F, includes provisions that limit out-of-network cost sharing for certain services provided through Dual Eligible Special Needs Plan preferred provider organizations beginning in 2026. These changes are designed to strengthen protections for beneficiaries who qualify for both Medicare and Medicaid, a population that often has fewer financial resources and more complex health needs.

However, this targeted reform leaves gaps. The new limits do not extend to the broader population of standard Medicare Advantage enrollees, who make up the majority of the market. For them, the current framework still hinges on whether CMS decides that a particular network change is substantial enough to warrant a Special Election Period. If the agency decides a disruption falls short of that threshold, affected members must either pay higher out-of-network costs or wait until the next annual enrollment period to switch plans, even if their preferred hospital is no longer in-network.

The absence of a public CMS dataset tracking how many beneficiaries lose hospital access each year through network exits makes it difficult to measure the scope of the problem. Neither consumers nor policymakers can easily see how frequently plans drop major hospitals, how long it takes CMS to respond, or how often the agency concludes that a change is not “significant.” That data gap complicates efforts to evaluate whether current safeguards are adequate or to compare how different insurers manage their networks over time.

Consumer advocates argue that more transparency around network changes could help beneficiaries make better choices during open enrollment. If Medicare Advantage plans were required to publish detailed information about pending hospital terminations and past disruptions, prospective enrollees could factor network stability into their decisions. Likewise, clearer public reporting on CMS determinations of significance could illuminate how consistently the agency applies its standards across states and insurers.

For now, the Delaware case stands as a reminder that protection from mid‑year hospital losses is not automatic. Beneficiaries must monitor notices from their plans, pay attention to communications from state agencies, and be prepared to act quickly if a Special Election Period is announced. As Medicare Advantage enrollment continues to grow, pressure is likely to build for more predictable rules so that patients are not left bearing the financial and clinical risks when hospitals and insurers decide to walk away from the negotiating table.